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Abstract
Previous experiments have found that subjecting participants to cognitive load leads
to poorer decision making, consistent with dual-system models of behavior. Rather
than taxing the cognitive system, this paper reports the results of an experiment that
takes a complementary approach: arousing the emotional system. The results indicate
that exposure to arousing visual stimuli as compared to neutral images has a negligible
impact on performance in arithmetic tasks, impatience, risk taking in the domain of
losses, and snack choice although we find that arousal modestly increases in risk-taking
in the gains domain and increases susceptibility to anchoring effects. We find the effect of arousal on decision making to be smaller and less consistent then the effect of
increased cognitive load for the same tasks.
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Introduction

Dual-system theories (Kahneman, 2002, 2011) propose that people have a hot “emotional”
system and a cool “reasoning” system that jointly interact in the decision making process.
Insofar as the goals for these two systems conflict, seemingly small environmental factors
that disproportionately activate one system over the other, can lead to big shifts in behavior.
Experimental studies that have taxed the reasoning system, via a cognitive load task, find
results consistent with such an implication: decision making shifts away from economically
normative behavior as indicated by less risk-taking, more impatient behavior, and greater
susceptibility to anchoring as well poorer math performance (see Deck and Jahedi, 2015). An
alternative, but unstudied, method by which to shift the balance between the two systems
is to directly excite the emotional system.
In this study, we test whether exciting the emotional system, via exposure to sexually
arousing images, has the same general impact on economic decision making as does taxing the
reasoning system. Exposure to sexual images has been shown to be a particularly effective
method to excite the emotional system of the brain (Arnow et al. 2002; Khn and Gallinant
2011; Wehrum-Osinsky et al. 2014).1 Moreover, given the fact that people scarcely tire from
viewing sexual stimuli, such images are ideal for use in experimentation, since it is possible
to maintain a continuous level of arousal for the study duration (Most, 2007; Sennwald et.
al, 2015).
Sexual images are pervasive in society: they are used extensively in advertising and entertainment in films, television and magazines; they are easily accessible in online collections;
and they are exchanged frequently in personal telecommunications. In a state of arousal, it
is reasonable to expect that the desire to pursue sex can cloud one’s judgment, often at the
expense of other objectives.2 The most direct effect of sexual arousal is likely to be on actions
that increase the chance of having sex. Indeed, studies have shown that participants exposed
to sexual stimuli are more willing to take larger sexual risks, such as not using condoms,
and are more willing to engage in morally questionable behaviors or rape (e.g. Blanton and
Gerrard, 1997; Ditto et al. 2006; Ariely and Loewenstein, 2006). It is less clear whether
there is a link between sexual arousal and decision making more generally.
1

In our study, we ask people to self-report their arousal level while viewing sexually explicit images. A
more direct measure that has been used in previous studies is phallometry, or measurement of the penile
erection response (Hanson and Bussiere, 1998). We did not elect this procedure as it seemed invasive and
overly-cumbersome to implement in return for the additional precision it would offer, but the evidence
suggests that sexually explicit images do elicit the desired physiological response.
2
Deaner et al (2005) find that even male rhesus monkeys are allured by images of female’s posteriors, and
are willing to take a cut in their fruit juice allowance to view these images. Sex, like hunger and sleep, is a
fundamental desire. The physiological effects of sleep on decision making has been discussed by Dickinson,
et al. (2014), while Ashton (2016) looks at the effects on hunger.
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There is some evidence that the effects of exposure to sexual stimuli spillover to decision
making more generally. McAlvanah (2009), for example, found that viewing photographs
of the opposite sex leads both males and females to engage in greater economic risk-taking
as compared to viewing photographs of cars. Knutson, et al. (2008) found that young
male participants who viewed erotic images were more likely to invest in risky stocks than
individuals exposed to neutral pictures. In the field, Dreber, et al. (2013) found that males
choose riskier strategies in their chess games against attractively-rated females, while Ronay
and von Hippel (2010) found that young male skateboarders increased their level of physical
risk taking in the presence of attractive females.
There are at least three papers that examine the impact of sexual arousal on impatience
and all find that people become dramatically more impatient when sexually aroused. Wilson
and Daly (2004) asked participants to make a series of choices for a payment made tomorrow
or a payment made at some point in the future. Participants then rated images of either
people or cars where the images had been pre-identified as being arousing or not. Finally,
participants made another set of temporal payment choices. Males who observed pictures of
“hot” women became significantly more impatient than men who observed pictures of less
attractive women but the classification of the car images had no effect.3
Van den Bergh et al. (2008) showed male subjects either 15 landscapes or 15 pictures
of women in sexually alluring attire. Participants were then asked for the amounts that
would make them indifferent between receiving 15 euro that day and receiving payment in
one week and in one month. Based on these hypothetical responses, Van den Bergh et al.
(2008) conclude that males shown the arousing images are significantly more impatient. A
similar result was found by handing men physical bras rather than physical t-shirts, not only
for cash but also for their willingness to wait for a larger quantity of food items.
Finally, Kim and Zauberman (2013) presented male participants with 15 pictures of
either lingerie models or neutral images and asked them to rate the images for attractiveness.
Participants were then asked to imagine having received a $65 Amazon.com gift certificate
and asked how much larger the gift certificate would need to be for them to wait either 3 or
12 months for it. Again, the hypothetical choices of the participants indicated they were far
more impatient when shown lingerie models.
Most experimental studies looking at arousal focus on a single task, have small sample
sizes, and are for hypothetical stakes. We improve on this methodology by using real stakes,
3

Participants in this study were informed that “they could win some money with a lucky throw of dice
at the end of the experiment, in which case they would receive one of their choices, randomly selected, so
they should make each choice as if it were actually to be paid off.” (pS177-S178). No information is given
as to what constitutes a luck throw of the die or how future payments would be made, so it is unclear the
degree to which the choices were salient to the participants.
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large sample sizes, and multiple tasks in a unified within-subject design. As our experiment
closely follows Deck and Jahedi (2015), a major contribution of this study is our ability to
compare the effect sizes arising from exposure to arousing stimuli (exciting System 1) to the
effect arising from an imposition of cognitive load (overloading System 2) for the same set of
tasks and procedures. Lull and Bushman (2015) conducted a meta-analysis examining the
old adage that “sex sells” and report that ads with more intense sexual content led to poorer
recall and buying intentions. They argue that sexual cues demand more cognitive resources
than non-sexual cues and that in essence people were paying attention to the sex and not
the rest of the ad. If sexual arousal siphons cognitive resources then the effect of sexual
arousal on decision making should impact behavior in the same direction as the cognitive
load results of Deck and Jahedi (2015), although based on the results reported by Wilson
and Daly (2004), Van den Bergh et al. (2008), and Kim and Zauberman (2013), one would
expect the effect sizes to be much larger than for cognitive load.
The goal of the current study is to provide systematic evidence of the effect that sexual
arousal has on basic economic behavior. Specifically, this paper reports the results of a controlled laboratory experiment, with salient incentives, in which subjects complete a variety of
standard economic tasks, including arithmetic tasks, risk tasks, impatience tasks, anchoring
tasks, and snack choice tasks. Prior to completing each task, participants are briefly exposed to either a neutral or arousing image, depending on their assigned treatment. Though
images in the neutral treatment were rated to be much less exciting than images in the
arousal treatment, there was relatively little effect of arousal on decision making. Performance on arithmetic tasks, risk taking in the loss domain, and patience over intertemporal
money tradeoffs did not vary according to treatment. Performance in the risk taking for
gains statistically improved in the arousal treatment (the higher expected value option was
more likely to be chosen) whereas performance in the anchoring task statistically diminished
in the arousal treatment although both effects are economically small.
The results when participants are placed under low and high arousal differ from the cognitive load results of Deck and Jahedi (2015). In the arousal treatment, participants are
more likely to take risk whereas the opposite was true in the high cognitive load treatment.
This is an important finding as it indicates that a tax on the reasoning system is not equivalent to stimulating the emotional system. Whereas dual system theory predicts that in both
settings, the emotional system will guide the decision making process, the results show that
in one case risk-taking increases and in the other case it decreases. For the other tasks, the
effect of sexual arousal was generally smaller than the effect of increased cognitive load.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental
design and describes choice of stimuli and the various economic tasks in more detail. Section
4

3 reports the effect of arousal on each task separately. Section 4 compares the results of
arousal to that of cognitive load, and makes closing remarks.
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Experimental Design

2.1

Participants

The participants were 144 adult males who had previously registered in Duke University’s
Fuqua School of Business Behavioral Lab participant pool. Attention was restricted to males
because prior evidence has shown that males are more clearly affected by sexually arousing
images. For example, Hamann, et al. (2004) found that sexually explicit images have a much
larger effect among males and this difference can be identified at the neurological level. In
another fMRI study, Klucken et al. (2009) presented a set of sexually arousing images to
male and female participants and found that learning was substantially affected by sexual
images and that neural activity was more acute for men than for women.
Potential participants were contacted via email and informed of the opportunity to complete the two part study. The recruitment email disclosed that study participants may be
exposed to sexually explicit images. Participants were required to register for two sessions
starting at the same time exactly oneweek apart. The first session lasted 60 minutes and
the second session lasted 10 minutes. Participants received a $2 payment for the first session
and a $10 payment for the second session. Participants were also informed that they could
earn additional compensation based upon their choices during the first session.

2.2

Methods

Participants were seated at partially enclosed cubicles to ensure that they could not observe
or interact with others. Fifty-three people were assigned to the neutral image condition and
91 were assigned to the arousal image condition. Neutral images included 80 pictures of
everyday objects such as office supplies, tiles, and housewares. Arousal images consisted of
80 explicit images of women and heterosexual couples engaging in various sexual acts. Eight
of the arousing images were selected from the Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention
at the University of Florida’s International Affective Picture System (IAPS) database. The
remaining images were downloaded from the internet.4
4

The IAPS images that were used are IAPS #4085, IAPS #4141, IAPS #4290, IAPS #4647, IAPS
#4658, IAPS #4672, IAPS #4800, and IAPS #4810. For access to images in the IAPS database, interested
readers should contact the Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention. Copies of the non-IAPS images
are available from the authors upon request.
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The use of sexual images to increase sexual arousal is a standard procedure. Rolls (2005)
argues that the brain is tricked into believing that there is a potential for sex when viewing
such material. Indeed, there is considerable evidence regarding how the brain responds to
sexual imagery. Arnow et al. (2002) expose males to erotic videos and measure penile
turgidity and brain activation and find clear relationships between the two. In a metaanalysis Khn and Gallinant (2011) find that sexual arousal is associated with activation in
both the emotional (amygdala, insula) and the cognitive (parietal cortex, ACC, thalamus,
insula) parts of the brain among other regions. Wehrum-Osinsky et al. (2014) report that
the neural response network for sexual stimuli is stable within subject.
As described below, participants completed a variety of decisions: Arithmetic, Risk,
Impatience, Anchoring, and Snack Choice. Every participant initially read the computerized
instructions privately and was allowed to practice sample versions of the tasks he would face
in the study. Everyone was shown sample images that are similar in nature to the ones
that he would see in the experiment. The pictures in the arousal condition were pixelated
in the instructions with the disclosure that images in the study would not be pixelated.
The participants were reminded that they could discontinue the study at any time. No
participant withdrew from the study.
Before each decision, a participant was presented with a condition appropriate image for
6 seconds. During this time, no action could be made. With the image still on the screen,
participants were then given 9 seconds to rate the image on a 10-point scale (from 1 being
the least exciting to 10 being the most exciting). After rating the image or time expiring,
the image was removed and the participant was presented with a randomly selected decision
task, equally likely to be an arithmetic task, a risk task, an impatience task, a snack choice
task, or an anchoring task. The random draw of tasks means that different participants
observed different numbers of each type of decision task.5
Once the participant completed 80 decision tasks, a short computerized survey was administered. The survey included a question about the participant’s level of sexual arousal
during the study, the participant’s sexual activities including pornography use, demographic
information, and questions to assess cognitive ability. A copy of the directions and the survey
are included in the appendix and a summary of the responses by treatment can be found in
Table 2. Once the survey was completed, one task was picked at random and the participant
was paid according to their choice in that task.
5

Almost everybody rated the image before time expired. In the neutral treatment, time lapsed before a
rating was registered for 34 out of the 4230 images (approximately 0.8%). In the arousal treatment, 43 out
of 7280 images were not rated (approximately 0.6%).
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Table 1: Experimental Tasks.
MAIN TASK
sub-task
ARITHMETIC

Description of how random tasks are generated
paid $12 for correct answer.

Addition

Add a1 + a2 where integer a1 ∼ U {11, ..., 99} and integer a2 ∼ U {1, ..., 9}.

Multiplication

Multiply m1 × m2 where integer m1 ∼ U {13, ..., 19} and integer m2 ∼ U {5, ..., 9}.

RISK
in Gain Domain

paid based on outcome
Typical question: Endowment of 2. Integer g drawn from ∼ U {6, ..., 13}.
Binary choice of guaranteed g or 50/50 chance of receiving (2g + 2, 0)
Additional question: Endowment of 2. Guaranteed 12 or 50/50 chance at 22 or 0.

in Loss Domain

Typical question: Endowment of 2g + 4, where g drawn from ∼ U {6, ..., 13}
Binary choice of guaranteed −g − 2 or 50/50 chance of receiving (0, −2g − 2)
Additional question: Endowment of 24. Guaranteed -10 or 50/50 chance at -22 or 0.

IMPATIENCE
less now vs.
more later

more now vs.
less later
ANCHORING

paid based on outcome
Now: $10.00

In one week: $10.25

Now: $10.00

In one week: $10.50

Now: $10.00

In one week: $10.70

Now: $10.00

In one week: $11.00

Now: $10.50

In one week: $11.00

Now: $11.00

In one week: $11.50

Now: $11.50

In one week: $11.75

Now: $11.50

In one week: $12.00

Now: $12.00

In one week: $12.50

Now: $12.00

In one week: $12.75

Now: $12.00

In one week: $13.00

Now: $12.00

In one week: $14.00

Now: $10.00

In one week: $9.50

Now: $10.50

In one week: $10.00

Now: $12.00

In one week: $11.00

paid for $12 if within five of the accurate count
A random number, d ∼ U {0, ..., 99}, is shown on the top of the participant’s screen.
A 10 by 10 table consisting of 5’s and S’s is briefly flashed to subject after which
participant is asked to guess whether the number of S’s in the table are above or below
the random number d. After the response, the subject is shown the table again and
is given 6 seconds to guess the number of S’s in the matrix.

SNACK CHOICE

paide based on outcome
Healthy and Unhealthy Snack Pairs, with accompanying pictures. (see appendix)
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2.2.1

Arithmetic Tasks

Two types of arithmetic tasks were included. As detailed in Table 1, Addition tasks required
the participant to add a two digit and a one digit number. Multiplication tasks required the
participant to multiply a two digit and a one digit number, see Table 1. Participants had 10
seconds to answer the question. A participant’s payoff for an arithmetic task was $12 if the
answer was correct and $0 if the answer was incorrect.
2.2.2

Risk Tasks

Risk tasks were presented in both the domain of gains and the domain of losses. A risk task
in the domain of gains gave the participant an endowment of $2 and asked him to select
between two options. One option was a fixed amount of money and the other was a lottery
that paid $0 with a 50 percent chance and some positive amount with a 50% chance. The
dollar possible dollar amounts are shown in Table 1. The participant’s earnings for the task
were based on their choice. In total, there were 9 possible risk tasks in the gain domain. For
eight of the tasks, the safe option had a lower expected value than the risky option. For one
of the tasks, the safe option had a higher expected value than the risky option.
Risk in the gain domain with endowment = 2.

Risk in the loss domain with endowment = 30

Figure 1: Sample Risk task in gains and losses
For risks in the loss domain, participants were presented a choice between a sure loss and
a lottery in which they would lose a larger amount with a 50% chance and with a 50% chance
8

would lose $0. See Table 1 for the specific values. The endowment for risks in the domain
of losses varied with the size of the lottery such that each risk choice in the loss domain
was identical to a possible risk choice in the gain domain in terms of the final payoffs.6
This means that for eight of the risk tasks in the loss domain, the safe option had a lower
expected value than the risky option while for the remaining option, the safe option had a
higher expected value than the risky option.
Participants had 10 seconds to make a decision. Failure to answer resulted in $0 earnings.
The sure payment was shown visually as a circle with a dollar amount inside. A lottery was
shown visually as a circle divided in half with the smaller payoff in the left semicircle and
larger payoff in the right semicircle. This presentation was designed to facilitate subject
comprehension of the choices (Eckel and Grossman 2002; Deck and Schlesinger 2014) Figure
2 shows the same sample task in both the gain and loss domains. The sure payment was
always presented on the right side of the screen to aid comprehension.
2.2.3

Impatience Task

When asking participants to choose between immediate and future payments, it is important
to minimize uncertainty regarding future payments in order to disentangle risk and impatience preferences.7 We reduced uncertainty about future payments in two ways: (1) we
asked participants to sign up for a two-part study, taking place exactly one week apart so
participants were aware of the expectation to return prior to signing up, and (2) we skewed
the show-up payments to the future ($2 for the first part, $10 next week), so that participants had an incentive to return. If subjects are confident that they will return in one week
to complete the study, there will be less risk associated with collecting future payments.
The impatience task asked participants to select between being paid $X today and $Y in
one week. The possible money pairs are summarized in Table 1. For most tasks $X ≤ $Y ;
however, for three money pairs, participants were given an option where $X > $Y , so the
amount of money today is larger than the amount of money in one week. These three pairs
are included as controls to verify that participants are paying attention to the numbers as the
future payment was always presented on the right side of the screen to aid comprehension.
The choice was presented to the participant using pictures of bills and coins totaling the
corresponding amount in addition to a listing of the nominal amount. This was done to
6

Institutional restrictions did not allow participants to lose money they had prior to entering the laboratory.
7
Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2013) have a nice paper that argues impatience should be measured
over effort tasks, rather than monetary rewards. The design of this study used monetary rewards for the
express purpose of mirroring a previous cognitive load study, so that the results could be compared (Deck
and Jahedi, 2015).
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parallel the snack choice task described below. The participant’s earnings for the task
equaled the selected option. Participants had 10 seconds to make a decision. Failure to
answer resulted in $0 earnings.
2.2.4

Anchoring Task

The anchoring task involved two stages. In the first stage the participant was shown a
randomly generated 10 x 10 matrix of letter “S” and number “5” characters for 2 seconds.
The participant was then asked: “Are there more “S” characters or fewer “S” characters
in the matrix that flashes below than the following randomly generated number?” The
randomly generated number was equally likely to be any integer from 0 to 99 and was
independent of the number of “S” characters in the matrix. The random number remained
on the screen and serves as the anchor. In the second stage, the participant was shown the
matrix a second time and had 6 seconds to count and report the number of “S” characters.
The allotted time was insufficient for the typical participant to actually count the characters.
If the participant’s guess was within 5 of the correct answer the participant’s earnings for
the task were $12. Otherwise the participant’s earnings were $0.
2.2.5

Snack Choice Task

The snack choice task presented two food options to the participant. The participant’s earnings for the task equaled the selected option, which was provided one week later. Participants
had 10 seconds to make a decision. Failure to answer resulted in no earnings for the task.
Delaying the payment of the snack choice eliminated the need to hold multiple units of each
snack choice in inventory. Each pair of snack options was selected so that the cost, category,
and size were similar. The “healthy” snack in the pair was the one that contained fewer
calories. A complete listing of the snack pairs is provided in the appendix.

2.3

Participant Characteristics

Table 2 provides summary statistics from the post-experiment survey. The success of the
manipulation is evidenced by the highly significant difference in responses to Q1 “How sexually aroused were you during the study?” For no other characteristic did the two groups
differ. Ten subjects reported their sexuality to be something other than heterosexual. The
analysis presented in the next section includes all subjects regardless of their stated sexual preferences; excluding non-heterosexual individuals does not qualitatively change the
findings.
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Table 2: Survey Responses (mean), by Treatment
Neutral

Arousal

(N = 53)

(N = 91)

1.14

2.74

- heterosexual

98%

91%

- homosexual

0%

5%

- bisexual

2%

2%

- other / prefer not to answer

0%

2%

Q3:

“How many minutes do you spend viewing pornography in a typical week?”

34.4

40.3

Q4:

“How many times have you experienced an ejaculation in the last month?”

14.6

15.7

Q5:

“Which of the following best describes your relationship status?”
- committed

39%

45%

- casual

12%

10%

- no relationship

49%

45%

Q6:

“In what year were you born? (YYYY)”

1987

1987

Q7:

“What is your college class?”

3.71

4.05

Q8:

“What is your college Grade Point Average?”

3.49

3.45

Q9:

“What is your race/ethnicity?”
- caucasian, non-hispanic

31%

30%

- Hispanic

8%

5%

- black or African

17%

17%

- Asian

42%

40%

- other / prefer not to answer

2%

8%

- less than $25,000

15%

14%

- $25,000 - $50,000

12%

20%

- $50,000 - $75,000

21%

24%

- $75,000 - $100,000

17%

14%

- over $100,000

35%

27%

33%

43%

35%

39%

54%

54%

(percent correct reported)

94%

93%

Q15:

“Good things come to those who wait. 1=disagree 5=agree”

3.65

3.56

Q16:

“Anticipation leads to greater enjoyment. 1=disagree 5=agree”

3.67

3.85

Q17:

“It is better to be safe than sorry. 1=disagree 5=agree”

3.33

3.64

41%

39%

Q1:

“How sexually aroused were you during the study? 1=least, 5=most”

Q2:

“How would you describe your sexuality?”

Q10:

Q11:

“What was the total income for the HH where you lived when you were 17?”

“A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?” (percent correct reported)

Q12:

“If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets?” (percent correct reported)

Q13:

“In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size.
If it takes 48 days to fill, how long for half?” (percent correct reported)

Q14:

Q18:

“When you flip a penny, what is the probability of it landing heads-side-up?”

“Suppose that you earned $100k in a lottery. How much would you invest in
an asset to either HALVE or DOUBLE in two years time with equal chance?”

*** denotes a significant difference at the 1% level in survey responses across treatments. A two-sample t test
was used for mean comparisons while a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to test equality of distributions.
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***

Figure 2: Image Rating Reported Across Treatment

3

Results

Figure 2 shows the average rating of images across treatments. The mean rating given to
images in the neutral treatment was 2.18 out of a 9-point scale while the mean rating given
to images in the arousal treatment was 5.50. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects
the hypothesis that the two ratings come from the same distribution (p < 0.001).8
Table 3 provides basic summary statistics. For each task and in each treatment, the mean
performance, the standard error, and number of observations are reported. The average
image rating associated with each task is also reported, as is the average number of seconds
spent. Note that the average image rating differs greatly by treatment, but not across tasks.
The average time spent in each task does not vary by treatment, but does vary across tasks.
Table 3 also indicates where the mean performance for a task differed across treatment
using stars. For each task, a single regression was run on the mean performance in the task
on a treatment dummy, with clustered standard errors at the participant level. The arousal
treatment increases normative behavior for the Risk in Gains task (Wald test, p = 0.058)
and reduces normative behavior in the Anchoring task (Wald test, p = 0.046). No other
8

Neither the image ratings, nor any of the results, change if we drop the self-reported homosexuals from
the sample.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics by Task and Treatment
Mean

Std. Error

Observations

Performance

Image

Seconds

Rating

Spent

Addition: percentage correct
Neutral

97.5%

(0.8%)

403

2.19

2.7

Arousal

97.7%

(0.6%)

730

5.49

2.6

Multiplication: percentage correct
Neutral

80.8%

(1.9%)

417

2.20

5.6

Arousal

79.7%

(1.5%)

738

5.52

5.6

Risk in Gains: higher expected value, could be safe or risky bet
Neutral

50.9%

(2.5%)

389

2.17

4.1

Arousal

60.9% (*)

(1.8%)

717

5.57

4.3

Risk in Losses: higher expected value, could be safe or risky bet
Neutral

48.1%

(2.5%)

403

2.19

4.2

Arousal

48.4%

(1.9%)

686

5.45

4.2

Impatience: larger amount of money, could be in the future or immediately
Neutral

62.5%

(1.7%)

834

2.17

3.4

Arousal

63.7%

(1.3%)

1440

5.5

3.4

Snack Choice: choose the healthy snack
Neutral

48.1%

(1.7%)

896

2.17

3.6

Arousal

45.9%

(1.3%)

1487

5.51

3.7

Anchoring: guess is within range of S-value
Neutral

44%

(1.7%)

886

2.19

5.7

Arousal

38.6% (**)

(1.3%)

1468

5.51

5.3

* and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.

significant differences were found.
Below, we report regression results for each task separately. In all cases a series of
regression results are provided, where standard errors are clustered at the participant level.
Model 1 includes only a dummy variable for the arousal treatment and mimics the analysis
done in Table 3. The second specification includes a time trend to account for the possibility
that the arousing images might have a cumulative effect, that participants might become
desensitized, or that there is learning in the tasks. The third specification controls for the
image rating to test the effect of more arousing ratings on behavior. The fourth specification
compares the most arousing images to the least arousing images. It repeats the same analysis
as Model 1, but does so on half of the observations: the 50% of neutral tasks with the lowest
average rating and the 50% of arousal tasks with the highest average rating. Model 5 allows
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for task-fixed controls: a dummy for each of the different types of questions that participants
might receive for that task. Model 6 controls for all the demographic characteristics gathered
from the survey responses. Finally, the last specification adds in all the controls jointly.

3.1

Arithmetic Tasks Results

Tables 4 and 5 analyze the effect of sexual arousal on addition and multiplication problems
respectively. Overall, the participants answered 98% of the addition problems correctly;
however, as revealed by the top row of Table 4, the performance does not differ between the
arousal and neutral conditions, regardless of what controls are included.
Not surprisingly, overall performance on the multiplication task was lower than in the
addition task (a Wald test of the baseline performance in Model 1, p < 0.001), indicating
that it was a harder task with participants answering 80% of the problems correctly. In
fact, a larger fraction of participants failed to provide an answer in the allotted time for the
multiplication problems (5.0%) as compared to the addition problems (0.1%). Nonetheless,
there is no effect of sexual arousal on multiplication performance (see Table 5) across any
of the specifications, though participants did exhibit a slight improvement in performance
across the course of the experiment (see Model 2 and Model 7).

3.2

Risk Tasks Results

Tables 6 and 7 analyze the effect of sexual arousal on risk taking. In the arousal treatment,
subjects are marginally more likely to take risks in the domain of gains. For most specifications in Table 6, a Wald test shows that the arousal treatment is 10 percentage points more
likely to choose the higher expected value option, at the 10% significance level. Hence, we
do find at least weak evidence that sexual arousal leads to greater risk taking (at least in
gains), consistent with Knutson, et al. (2008). In the loss domain, there is no statistical
difference between the treatments for any of the specifications in Table 7.
Almost everybody responded to the questions in the allotted time. Fewer than 0.5% of
participants ran out time in the risk task and the rate was nearly identical for gains and
losses. For most questions, the risky option had a higher expected value. In situations where
the safe option had the higher expected value, people were more likely to choose the higher
expected value option, but not significantly so.
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15
1133

X

1128

0.003

[0.018]

0.966***

547

0.000

[0.013]

0.979***

1133

0.101

[0.023]

1.035***

1069

0.479

[0.041]

0.154***

1065

0.542

[0.070]

0.240***

X

X

[0.001]

[0.002]
[0.018]

0.000

X

[0.014]

0.01

b/se

Model 7

0.004*

* significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%

1133

Observations

[0.024]

[0.016]
0.000

0.971***

0.975***
0.000

-0.004

[0.014]

0.018

b/se

Model 6

[0.000]

[0.019]

-0.002

b/se

Model 5

[0.000]

[0.023]

b/se

Model 4

0.000

[0.019]

[0.020]

-0.011

b/se

Model 3

0.000

0.001

0.002

b/se

b/se

R2

Constant

demographics

task-fixed

Extreme image comparison

Image rating

Period

Arousal Treatment

Model 2

Model 1

OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.

Dependent variable is whether the addition problem was answered correctly.

Table 4: Addition Task
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1155

X

1147

0.001

[0.043]

0.796***

558

0.001

[0.042]

0.801***

1155

0.028

[0.055]

0.907***

1077

0.210

[0.223]

0.479**

1069

0.250

[0.232]

0.485**

X

X

[0.006]

[0.009]
[0.049]

0.003

X

[0.048]

0.055

b/se

Model 7

0.004

* significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%

1155

Observations

[0.041]

[0.034]
0.006

0.757***

0.808***
0.000

0.025

[0.048]

0.056

b/se

Model 6

[0.001]

[0.043]

-0.015

b/se

Model 5

[0.001]

[0.048]

b/se

Model 4

0.002***

[0.044]

[0.044]

-0.024

b/se

Model 3

0.001**

-0.013

-0.011

b/se

b/se

R2

Constant

demographics

task-fixed

Extreme image comparison

Image rating

Period

Arousal Treatment

Model 2

Model 1

OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.

Dependent variable is whether the multiplication problem was answered correctly.

Table 5: Multiplication Task
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1106

X

1103

0.010

[0.045]

0.513***

580

0.008

[0.049]

0.507***

1106

0.023

[0.056]

0.618***

1043

0.156

[0.334]

0.825**

1041

0.167

[0.335]

0.987***

X

X

[0.008]

[0.009]
[0.061]

-0.006

X

[0.074]

0.125*

b/se

Model 7

-0.002

* significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%

1106

Observations

[0.049]

[0.043]
0.010

0.495***

0.509***
0.009

0.095

[0.072]

0.117

b/se

Model 6

[0.001]

[0.052]

0.097*

b/se

Model 5

[0.001]

[0.064]

b/se

Model 4

0.000

[0.052]

[0.053]

0.108*

b/se

Model 3

0.000

0.101*

0.100*

b/se

b/se

R2

Constant

demographics

task-fixed

Extreme image comparison

Image rating

Period

Arousal Treatment

Model 2

Model 1

OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.

Dependent variable is whether higher EV option was chosen.

Table 6: Risk in Gains Task

18
1089

X

1084

0.004

[0.046]

0.446***

504

0.000

[0.044]

0.482***

1089

0.012

[0.059]

0.437***

1018

0.188

[0.289]

0.631**

1013

0.205

[0.313]

0.568*

X

X

[0.011]

[0.010]
[0.059]

0.004

X

[0.085]

0.076

b/se

Model 7

0.016

* significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%

1089

Observations

[0.047]

[0.042]
0.001

0.505***

0.481***
0.000

0.023

[0.076]

0.077

b/se

Model 6

[0.001]

[0.055]

0.004

b/se

Model 5

[0.001]

[0.066]

b/se

Model 4

-0.001

[0.055]

[0.055]

-0.045

b/se

Model 3

-0.001

0.003

0.003

b/se

b/se

R2

Constant

demographics

task-fixed

Extreme image comparison

Image rating

Period

Arousal Treatment

Model 2

Model 1

OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.

Dependent variable is whether higher EV option was chosen.

Table 7: Risk in Losses Task

3.3

Impatience Task Results

Before presenting the overall pattern of results for the impatience task, we report that on the
three questions where the participants were asked to choose between more money now and
less money in the future, the delayed payment was only selected approximately 2% of the
time and this rate did not differ between the arousal and neutral treatments. This indicates
that subjects were paying close attention to the choices and not simply behaving randomly
or automatically. In only 0.2% of all of impatience tasks did participants fail to make a
selection in the time allotted.
Table 8 provides the econometric evidence for determining if there is a treatment effect
on impatience. There is not - in no specification is the treatment significant even marginally.
It is worth noting that in all specifications, the sign of the arousal coefficient is positive, in
the direction of aroused participants being more patient. This stands in direct contrast to
Wilson and Daly (2004), Van den Bergh et al. (2008), and Kim and Zauberman (2013).

3.4

Snack Choice Task Results

Participants chose the healthy snack option slightly less than half of the time, but this did
not differ by treatment as evidenced by Table 9. It is also worth noting that there is no
time trend in snack choice. That is, the data do not indicate that participants experienced
a depletion of their will power, contrary to previous work by Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999 and
Baumeister 2002. The non-response rate was 4.6% for snack choices.

3.5

Anchoring Task Results

In the anchoring task, participants were flashed a random number, between 0 and 99, and
then asked to guess the number of “S” characters in a matrix. Participants knew that
the random number was not associated in any way with the task, yet the average guess of
responses exhibited quite a bit of anchoring. The guess of respondents was twice as likely to
be on the same side of the true number as the anchor rather than on the opposite side. That
is, if there were 50 “S” characters in the matrix and the anchor was 10, respondents were
twice as likely to make a guess that was below 50 than to make a guess above 50. Similarly
if there were 50 “S” characters in the matrix and the anchor was 90, respondents were twice
as likely to make a guess that was above 50 than to make a guess that was below 50. This
did not differ across treatments.
In Table 10, we define normative behavior in the Anchoring task as whether participants’
guess was within the allotted range to receive payment. In the neutral treatment, 44% of
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responses were in the correct range whereas in the arousal treatment, 38.6% of guesses were
in the correct range. The difference remains similar in magnitude and significance across
most specifications, indicating that arousal caused participants to do worse on the Anchoring
task. It is important to note that a decrease in the anchoring performance does not imply
that people are more susceptible to anchoring; rather, it may simply be the case that people
in the arousal treatment are more distracted.9
There is a positive time trend, indicating that respondents improved their behavior over
time. Interestingly, there is a negative coefficient on the image rating, indicating that images
with higher ratings are associated with a worse performance. In Model 4, where we compare
performance in the Anchoring task of those images rated lowest in the neutral treatment as
compared to those images rated highest in the arousal treatment, we find that the effect size
of the treatment grows to 9%.

4

Discussion

Overall, we find rather minimal evidence that viewing erotic images has an impact on decision
making. Contrary to previous studies, we find no evidence that sexual arousal leads to more
impatience, despite the fact that the stimuli used in our study were generally more explicit
than the stimuli reported in other studies.10 We do however find evidence in favor of more
risk-taking in the gain domain when viewing explicit images, although not as dramatically
as in Knutson, et al. (2008). Taken together, the evidence suggests that sexual arousal does
not generate the same behavioral patterns as cognitive load.
One possible explanation for why we do not find a large effect of arousal on preferences is
that our study uses real incentives, rather than hypothetical choices. It is possible that the
incentive payments are large enough that respondents are motivated to make good decisions
in spite of being exposed to arousing stimuli. Alternatively, it is possible that participants
realize the effect that arousal might have on their decision making and take additional steps
to self-regulate their decision making process. For instance, they may take more time on
a question if they are exposed to an arousing image as compared to a neutral image so to
ensure that they reach the correct answer. Based on the time spent on each task however,
this does not appear to be the case (see Table 3).
9

While it is outside the scope of this study, one could design a method to differentiate the effect of
distraction and arousal on anchoring performance. For instance, it is possible to gather distracting images
for use in both the neutral and arousal group. If the result was due to a distraction, there should be no
difference in behavior across the groups.
10
Pilot studies were conducted with images of women in lingerie, similar to Kim and Zauberman (2013),
but no effect was identified and thus more extreme images were used.

20

21
2274

X

2265

0.000

[0.052]

0.632***

1118

0.001

[0.052]

0.616***

2274

0.177

[0.040]

0.986***

2137

0.208

[0.339]

-0.349

2129

0.376

[0.339]

0.049

X

X

[0.008]

[0.010]
[0.064]

-0.002

X

[0.088]

0.113

b/se

Model 7

-0.003

* significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%

2274

Observations

[0.050]

[0.049]
0.000

0.638***

0.625***
0.000

0.030

[0.088]

0.097

b/se

Model 6

[0.000]

[0.059]

0.012

b/se

Model 5

[0.000]

[0.071]

b/se

Model 4

0.000

[0.061]

[0.061]

0.021

b/se

Model 3

-0.000

0.012

0.012

b/se

b/se

R2

Constant

demographics

task-fixed

Extreme image comparison

Image rating

Period

Arousal Treatment

Model 2

Model 1

OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.

Dependent variable is whether larger money option was chosen.

Table 8: Time Preference Task

22
2383

X

2372

0.001

[0.052]

0.477***

1208

0.000

[0.053]

0.463***

2383

0.019

[0.060]

0.594***

2238

0.189

[0.330]

0.226

2228

0.212

[0.324]

0.334

X

X

[0.008]

[0.009]
[0.065]

0.015*

X

[0.085]

0.051

b/se

Model 7

0.003

* significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%

2383

Observations

[0.051]

[0.048]
0.001

0.464***

0.481***
0.000

-0.009

[0.085]

0.077

b/se

Model 6

[0.000]

[0.059]

-0.022

b/se

Model 5

[0.000]

[0.068]

b/se

Model 4

0.000

[0.060]

[0.060]

-0.036

b/se

Model 3

0.000

-0.022

-0.022

b/se

b/se

R2

Constant

demographics

task-fixed

Extreme image comparison

Image rating

Period

Arousal Treatment

Model 2

Model 1

OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.

Dependent variable is whether healthy snack choice was chosen.

Table 9: Snack Choice Task

23
2354

X

2344

0.006

[0.025]

0.468***

1143

0.008

[0.027]

0.458***

2354

0.156

[0.066]

0.925***

2203

0.061

[0.123]

0.420***

2193

0.214

[0.139]

0.892***

X

X

[0.005]

[0.005]
[0.034]

-0.012**

X

[0.035]

-0.045

b/se

Model 7

-0.012**

* significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%

2354

Observations

[0.027]

[0.022]
0.018

0.332***

0.440***
0.003

-0.089***

[0.035]

-0.088**

b/se

Model 6

[0.000]

[0.025]

-0.053**

b/se

Model 5

[0.000]

[0.031]

b/se

Model 4

0.003***

[0.026]

[0.027]

-0.018

b/se

Model 3

0.003***

-0.052*

-0.054**

b/se

b/se

R2

Constant

demographics

task-fixed

Extreme image comparison

Image rating

Period

Arousal Treatment

Model 2

Model 1

OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.

Dependent variable is whether guess is within specified range of actual.

Table 10: Anchoring Task

Table 11: Comparison of Treatment Effects
Change
due to

Change

Cognitive

due to

Low Load

High Load

Load

Neutral

Arousal

Arousal

Addition

97.8%

97.0%

-0.8%

97.5%

97.7%

0.2%

Multiplication

71.6%

55.9%

-15.7%

80.8%***

79.7%

-1.1%***

Risk in Gains

59.5%

52.7%

-6.8%

50.9%***

60.9%

10.0%***

Risk in Losses

45.7%

43.9%

-1.8%

48.1%

48.4%

0.3%

Time Preference

56.9%

50.0%

-6.9%

62.5%*

63.7%

1.2%*

Snack Choice

43.7%

39.4%

-4.3%

48.1%

45.9%

-2.2%

Anchoring

50.1%

40.9%

-9.2%

44.0%

38.6%

-5.4%

Of course, it is difficult to compare studies given the many differences in their procedures.
However, a study that closely mimics this one (Deck and Jahedi, 2015) uses the exact same
set of tasks to test for the effect of cognitive load on decision making. Table 11 compares
the results of the two studies.
Note that the baseline conditions of the two studies (low load and neutral images) are
rather similar. Stars in the Neutral column of Table 11 indicate whether the neutral treatment and the low cognitive load treatment differed significantly. There is no difference between the two studies for the Addition, Anchoring, Snack Choice, and Risk in Losses tasks.
The participants of this study, which consisted of male Duke students, did score statistically
better on the multiplications questions and were statistically more patient when it came to
money as compared to the male and female Arkansas students who participated in the cognitive load study. That the Duke students exhibit statistically less normative behavior in risk
taking is somewhat surprising given that males are often found to be more risk loving (see
Eckel and Grossman 2008). However, none of the differences are economically substantial.
The fact that the two studies, conducted at different institutions and using different gender
compositions, have somewhat similar baselines suggests that the tasks are broadly robust to
replicability.11
In the cognitive load study, normative behavior always decreased as a result of cognitive
load. In the arousal study, the effect of sexual arousal sometimes diminished normative
behavior and sometimes improved normative behavior. The stars in the ‘Change due to
11

The experiments in Deck and Jahedi (2015) were conducted at the University of Arkansas and had male
and female participants. Unfortunately, gender data is not available for the participants in Deck and Jahedi
(2015).
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Arousal’ treatment of Table 11 compare the effect of sexual arousal to the effect of cognitive
load. Most interestingly, for the Risk in Gains task, participants that were aroused were 10
percentage points more likely to choose the higher expected value outcome. This is a big
contrast to the effect of cognitive load on the Risk in Gains task, where participants were 6.8
percentage points less likely to choose the higher expected value outcome. This difference is
significant both statistically and economically. One implication of this finding is that a tax
on cognition and the arousal of emotion do not have the same effect on risk-taking, despite
the fact that they both conceivably diminish cognitive ability.
These findings suggest that a shift away from using cognitive resources can impact behavior in a domain-specific way. In some instances (under cognitive load), the intuitive response
leads to a reduction of risk-taking whereas in other instances (sexual arousal), the intuitive
response leads to an increase in risk-taking. Of course, in our experiment, risk-taking was
overwhelmingly associated with a higher expected value payoff. The same result need not
necessarily hold if risk-taking is associated with a lower expected value payoff. Nonetheless,
our findings suggest that the behavioral impact of a stimulus can rely heavily on its context and that a more nuanced interplay might be required when working in the dual system
framework.
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Appendix
This appendix contains information observed by the participant. The first section includes the directions for the neutral image condition. Directions for the arousal treatment are available upon request. The second section contains the post study survey and
the third section presents the images used for the snack choice task.
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Participant Directions
Instructions:
Welcome, and thank you for participating in this experiment.
The study will take place in two parts. The first part will last about 60 minutes. For
participating in this part, you will be guaranteed a $2 payment. The second part will take
place exactly one week later and will last about 10 minutes and will pay a guaranteed
show-up fee of $10. You can earn additional money based on the decisions that you
make, therefore it is important that you read the directions carefully. If you have any
questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter
to come to you. Please do not make noise or communicate with others for the duration
of the experiment as this is grounds for dismissal. Note that you can leave at any point
during the experiment, and you will be paid a $2 show-up fee.
In this study, there will be 80 periods. In each period, you will be shown a picture and
asked to rate it. Once you enter your rating, the picture will disappear and you will be
given a decision task. Your goal will be to complete the decision task in the allotted
time. The type of task will vary by period and will be described in more detail below.
After all tasks are completed, one of them will randomly be chosen by the computer to
count towards your final payment.

The Decision Tasks In each period, you will be given a decision task. The decision
tasks vary from one period to the next, but can be categorized into 5 broad groups:
(1) math problems, (2) counting problems, (3) a choice between lotteries, (4) a choice
regarding your preference for money allocation across time, and (5) a choice between
two consumption bundles. You will be allowed to practice each type of decision task on
the following pages.
Decision Task: Math Problems For the math problems, you will be asked either
addition or multiplication questions. If you get the problem correct, you will receive
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$12 for the task. If you get the problem incorrect or if you run out of time without
answering, you will receive $0 for the task. Please click Continue to practice some math
problems.

Decision Task: Counting Problems Besides the math problems, you may also face
counting problems. The counting problem consists of two parts. In the first part, you
will briefly be shown a matrix of S characters and 5 characters and be asked to guess
whether the number of S’s in the matrix is more or fewer than a random generated
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number. The randomly generated number has no association to the number of S’s in
the matrix.
Once you make your guess, you will be shown the same matrix again for ten seconds
and asked to state the exact count of “S” characters in the matrix. In order to get
paid, your guess must be made in time and be within five of the actual amount of “S”
characters in the matrix. If you meet this criteria, you will be paid $12. Otherwise, you
will be paid $0. Please note that it is easy to run out of time for this question. Please
click Continue to practice some counting decision problems.
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Decision Task: Choice between Lotteries Besides the math and counting problems,
you may also face a choice between lotteries. For the lottery problems, you will be given
additional money (an endowment) to use towards your decision. You will always be
asked to choose between two options: (1) a lottery that returns a sure outcome with
certainty OR (2) a lottery that returns either a larger outcome or zero, with 50 percent
chance.
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Please click Continue to practice some lottery decisions. You will be asked some additional questions (that will not be on the actual lottery task) just to make sure that you
understand your payoffs.

Decision Task: Time Allocation Problem Besides the math, counting, and lottery
problems, you will also face choices about your preference for money allocation across
time. You will be asked whether you prefer some amount of money today or a different
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amount of money next week. For example, you may be asked to choose between $10
today or $12 next week. This question is for real stakes. So if you choose to receive
money today, you will get it at the end of today’s part of the experiment. If you choose
to receive the money next week, it will be given to you along with your show-up fee
next week. If you run out of time before reaching a decision, you will receive $0 for the
task. Please click Continue to practice some time allocation problems.

Decision Task: Consumption Bundles Besides the math, counting, lottery problems, and time-money preferences, you will be asked about your preference regarding
two sets of goods. The two goods are consumption bundles, which will be awarded next
week. So whatever you choose, it will be given to you along with your show-up fee next
week. If you run out of time before reaching a decision, you will not receive anything
next week. Please click Continue to practice consumption bundle problems.
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Final Payoff Determination In total, you will make 80 decisions in this experiment,
one in every period. Once all decisions have been made, you will be asked a few survey
questions. After that, you will have completed the experiment. The computer will randomly select only ONE of the periods to be your “payoff determining task.” The payoff
determining task will be used to calculate your earnings for the experiment. Please note
that since it is equally likely that any of the 80 decisions that you make are chosen to
determine your payoff, it is important that you treat each decision as if it were the one
that counts.
Your final payment will be the sum of your $2 show-up fee today, your $10 show-up fee
next week, and the amount of money or the items of products that you made in the
payoff determining task.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will answer it.
If there are no questions, you may continue to the experiment.
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Table A.1: Snack Choice Pairs.
Snack Pair Healthy Choice

1

2

3

4

5

6
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Unhealthy Choice

Table A.1 – Continued
Snack Pair Healthy Choice

7

8
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Unhealthy Choice

Post Experiment Questionnaire
1. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being not at all aroused and 5 being extremely aroused,
how sexually aroused were you during the study?
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

2. How would you most accurately described your sexuality?
homosexual; bisexual; other / prefer not to answer}

{heterosexual;

3. How many minutes do you spend viewing pornography in a typical week?

4. How many times have you experienced an ejaculation in the last month?
5. Which of the following best describes your relationship status?
{Married or in
a committed relationship; Not married or in a committed relationship, but in one or
more casual relationships; Not in a relationship}

6. In what year were you born? (YYYY)

7. What is your college class?
Not in college}

{Freshman; Sophomore; Junior; Senior; Graduate;

8. What is your college Grade Point Average?
9. What is your race/ethnicity?
{Caucasian, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; Black or
African; Asian; Other/Prefer not to Answer}

10. What was the total income range for the household where you lived when you were
17?
{Less than $25,000; $25,000-$50,000; $50,000-$75,000; $75,000-$100,000; Over
$100,000}

11. When you flip a penny, what is the probability of it landing heads-side-up?

39

12. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost?

13. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets?

14. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake?

15. Suppose that you earned $100,000 in lottery winnings. How much of the $100,000
would you be willing to invest in an asset to either HALVE or DOUBLE in two years
time with equal probability?
{None of it; 10%; 20%; 30%; 40%; 50%; 60%; 70%;
80%; 90%; All of it}

On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being complete disagreement and 5 being complete agreement, how much do you agree with the following statements:
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

16. Good things come to those who wait.

17. Anticipation leads to greater enjoyment.

18. It is better to be safe than sorry.

{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
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